Despite increasing advancements in today's information exchange infrastructure, the preservation of user data and privacy still remains a problem. Both insecure baselines and secure solutions leak user data. For example, Certi cate Transparency (CT) promises signi cant security improvements to existing Public Key Infrastructure solutions that up-to-now have solely relied on the Certi cate Authority hierarchy. CT provides a robust auditing layer and transparency solution to quickly detect such compromises, but introduces the requirement that client browsers interact with third-party servers when validating a site certi cate.
Even worse, failure in the CA system is an "or" condition, not an "and" condition. There are dozens of CAs in existence, and it only takes one of them to be compromised in order for all the sites dependent on it to be compromised, even if said websites had their public keys stored with other
CAs. These incidents can expose large numbers of users to active man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks.
In response to these growing concerns, Certi cate Transparency (CT) is a new protocol that addresses these issues by enabling users, CAs, and domain owners to audit certi cate changes and identify and monitor potential modi cations directly relevant to them [ ]. Recently, CT has seen uptake by both web browsers and CAs, with Google Chrome requiring all trusted CAs to partake in the protocol since [ ]. All changes are logged via hashed chains of Merkle tree roots, preventing editing of prior history and allowing easy auditing of future changes.
However, CT is not without its aws. In particular, it represents an additional communication channel -as part of normal operation, users query servers hosting CT log for certi cates matching domains with which they wish to communicate as shown in Figure . . This querying is a central part of the CT protocol, but has the side e ect that a malicious log server can glean private information about the user from their queries, namely, correlating the IP address of the request with the domains visited over time.
Such tracking could easily be performed without consent. Particularly worrisome is that these log servers have nancial incentive to do exactly that: transparently collect user browsing data and sell it to industry players in advertisement and tracking. This example is just one of many instances that illustrate the privacy concerns that arise from requiring users to contact a third Figure . : A simpli ed architecture diagram for Certi cate Transparency. Assuming an honestbut-curious log server, request C is problematic as it reveals to the log server what sites the client is visiting.
party (CT logs) to communicate with any desired domain. In general, users should be able to bene t from CT without sacri cing their privacy.
Previous e orts to maintain privacy in Certi cate Transparency and other data retrieval systems are discussed in Section . In this project, we seek to extend the CT protocol to preserve users' privacy from the log servers that they query.
We outline our de nition of privacy with subsequent design goals in this setting in Section .
Our solution should be usable and scalable, in order to e ciently service hundreds of millions of users, without sacri cing user privacy by revealing their queries to the server.
In Section we describe our solution. We use an ORAM le sharing system [oram-lesharing] to achieve the base security properties, and add system-level performance improvements to make it more usable. We do this by precomputing encryption exponentiations and garbled circuits, pipelining phases of the transfer protocol, and batching requests.
Despite implementing all of our improvements, we discovered that we did not meet our scalability goals. Even so, we saw better performance that points to a possibility of meeting those goals in the future. This will be further discussed in Section .
Related Work
. Privacy is preserved because each party is involved in a di erent share of the computation. A knows the random values used in generating the garbled circuit but never comes in contact with input b. B receives A's inputs, but does not know what it is because A is in charge of the scrambling and encryption.
. Oblix
Oblix [ ], or OBLivious IndeX, is a space-and time-e cient search index that neither leaks access patterns nor result size. It works by maintaining an obliviously sorted multimap, which essentially links keys to values while ensuring that any given client requests are computationally indistinguishable from random requests. To do so it requires many of the same cryptographic techniques that we will use in our proposed solution, including garbling, ORAM, Merkle hash trees, and oblivious data structures (including the obliviously sorted multimap).
Oblix has been demonstrated to be useful in private retrieval of public keys in the case of certi cate transparency, and in fact solves the basic problem statement presented at the beginning of this paper. However, it does rely on trusting secure hardware enclaves, which our solution will avoid.
Design . Security . . Threat Model
We assume that we have access to two non-colluding servers. These servers can be passive eavesdroppers (honest-but-curious) -they can observe any local state not secret-shared between the servers and have full access to client communications with itself.
While requiring two non-colluding servers is perhaps unrealistic in many domains, it ts the certi cate transparency system well, where many di erent companies are providing CT services.
These di erent entities could very well be nancial competitors (e.g. Google versus Symantec), and sharing collected datasets would eliminate their commercial advantages. Under our threat model, a CT provider running in this way does not have to be trusted by any clients making requests for certi cate proofs.
We assume that CT security properties are still valid, namely, that unauthorized and/or malicious modi cations to certi cates will be detected with extremely high probability by a su cient number of auditing nodes. Thus, we focus speci cally on the privacy implications of CT queries.
. . Security Definition
We de ne security as preserving the user's privacy. When a user queries the CT server, they should be able to receive the correct proof for the desired domain without revealing to the server what they asked for.
Even if given two potential domains a and b, and observing many client requests for one of the domains, a malicious CT log provider should not be able to infer the identity of the queried site any better than a random guesser. Similarly, patterns of requests for the same domain should not reveal any information to the server (e.g. a new movie trailer drives a sudden tra c spike to streaming website a.com so any new repeated requests to a given domain is more likely to be a request for that website).
Our security de nition only concerns itself with user privacy, and not that of the server. Since certi cate information is meant to be public anyway, it is not a major security threat for a client to know the public keys of domains that they did not ask for. However, we still wish to avoid this scenario to minimize overhead and unnecessary transfers.
. Design Proposal . . Goals
We focus on two primary design goals:
• Client queries for a domain's certi cate do not leak the requested domain to the CT server, as discussed above, without relying on a trusted third party or hardware enclave.
• Preserving client privacy imposes reasonable overheads on CT log administration and user requests.
. . Oblivious Merkle Trees
Merkle trees are a special type of binary tree in which a node's value is equal to a hash of its children. Thus, if the value of a node changes even a tiny bit, that change will propagate up to the value of the Merkle tree root [ ].
In the context of certi cate transparency, Merkle trees provide a mechanism for users to check the validity of a certi cate from a log server with logarithmic e ciency [ ]. An attacker trying to falsify a certi cate cannot realistically nd hash collisions well enough to give a valid proof.
Merkle trees make it infeasible for an attacker to edit or append certi cates without being quickly caught.
However, traditional CT allows the server storing the Merkle tree can easily determine which node a client is requesting the validity proof for (and thus which website a client is trying to visit). This is because the proof consists of the siblings of the nodes on the path from the root to the node the client wishes to validate.
To make certi cate transparency work privately, we need to store Merkle trees obliviously.
While Oblix [ ] is successful at this, our goal is to do the same without relying on secure hardware enclaves. Speci cally, we wish to access speci c nodes of the Merkle tree, just as in the nonoblivious certi cate transparency public key lookup and proof, without revealing which node we accessed. Figure . : The two servers use two-party computation to create the client's request, without knowing the other's share.
We do this by using two non-colluding servers that are capable of PC. Similar to the Oblix Merkle tree implementation, nodes are identi ed using an oblivious index [ ]. Instead of relying on secure enclave, however, we take advantage of the "separation of powers" provided by two-party computation.
We store the Merkle tree nodes and certi cate data using ORAM [ ] on one server, and the position mappings on the other. One server knows the values of the nodes, and the other server knows the positions of the nodes, but neither knows both. Only the user gets both the position and value shares, and can assemble this information privately to generate the Merkle tree proof. This setup still uses the original tree structure of the data nodes and operates at O(log n) per request.
.
. Scalability
The crux of our solution to providing private queries on public CT data relies on a scalable private storage mechanism. Many existing private storage solutions (as discussed in Section are ine cient, do not scale to many users, rely on a trusted proxy or specialized hardware, or some combination of these.
Using ORAM and PC alone would ful ll the rst requirement. However, while oblivious le sharing performs signi cantly better than existing private le storage systems, its initial version is does not scale to serve the entire world's CT requests. The basic system can only process a single request at a time in serial due to the ORAM construction, so multiple users making many simultaneous requests results in fast-growing latencies. Currently, reading a KB le from this basic system takes about . s when there are many les in the system under our testing setup, which we will discuss further in Section .
One key design consideration for CT is that because certi cate validation is performed online and in batches, providing latencies that are good enough for real-time browsing is unnecessary in this context. However, to realistically serve many clients, our system must be able to more gracefully handle multiple requests in parallel.
A primary focus of our project is to modify this existing system to make it more e ciently serve multiple concurrent requests. We do so by precomputing encryption exponentiations and garbled circuits, pipelining relevant stages, and batching similar requests.
Implementation . Implementing Oblivious Merkle Trees
We make the same assumptions as was mentioned in the threat model in Section : the client has access to two mutually distrustful servers. These servers can both independently be passively malicious, but they do not collude. In implementing the oblivious Merkle tree, we use C and its associated libraries like Obliv-C [ ] for the baseline system implementation.
One server is responsible for storing the actual data, that is, the certi cate transparency Merkle tree nodes. The other server knows the random position mapping for the nodes (analogous to the oblivious index of Oblix). By using oblivious transfer, the two servers can secret share the position mapping and use two-party computation to generate the two shares of the nal value. As the client is the only one that possesses both shares simultaneously, they are they only one who receives the nal result. A basic version of this protocol is shown in Algorithm .
Once a node has been accessed, it must be evicted and and randomly placed back in the server as in Circuit ORAM to prevent the server from linking a previous request to a later request. Otherwise, a server will be able to tell that the user has accessed the same node multiple times. The eviction protocol is shown in Algorithm . 
. Implementing Scaling
In this section, we describe our changes to the baseline oblivious le sharing system implementation that allow it to scale more e ciently when servicing multiple requests concurrently.
. . Precomputation
Oblivious transfer protocols use asymmetric encryption and garbled circuits. Both of these processes are computationally expensive and used many times in the sharing protocol, but are also independent of the inputs and CT itself. Thus, they can be precomputed o ine, separate from the actual requests. This should improve both individual request latency as well as the total throughput of the system.
Modern asymmetric encryption schemes involve computing exponents of very large numbers.
This can be done in a separate thread from the one that services requests. Afterwards, the values can be retrieved as needed. We only need to be careful to protect the precomputed exponentiations from cache timing attacks.
Garbled circuits [ ] are also very time-consuming because they cannot be reused, and a new one must be computed for each transfer. Having one server generate a garbled circuit and then transfer it to the other only when needed introduces signi cant latency and could be o oaded to another set of servers that computes them o ine or in the background. Again, this can be computed simultaneously with and separately from the rest of the transfer protocol. While the garbled circuit itself is important for the transfer, the composition of the circuit itself is independent of the request so long as it takes the proper number of inputs, is properly randomized, and changed for every request. We generate the garbled circuits in a separate thread on demand.
. . Pipelining
The system's server-side protocol to access les can be seen as a series of sequential stages. Some of these stages must be performed sequentially for a single request, while others can happen in parallel.
The nine main stages of a single request are listed below:
. Receiving client requests and validating commitments.
. Performing permissions checks on the user and les.
. Obliviously fetching the CT Merkle tree node positions.
. Obliviously fetching the CT Merkle tree proof nodes.
. Generating a permutation to shu e the paths in ORAM.
. Applying the generated permutation to ORAM.
. Computing the PC result shares for each server.
. Secret sharing the result to the client.
. Recomputing the result based on the given secret shares.
The system cannot concurrently fetch a new path from ORAM while the previous permutation
has not been applied to ORAM. This results either in a loss of obliviousness if the permutation is not performed at all, or an incorrect lookup if the two operations happen concurrently.
On the other hand, stages -are completely independent of the following stages, as long as we are careful not to nish the revealing process before the validations and permissions checks are nished. This suggests that the system could bene t from pipelining these stages, or overlapping the execution stages across requests to provide partial parallelism and improve performance when servicing multiple requests.
Our design is limited by the fact that Obliv-C [ ] currently only supports a single thread running two-party computations. This means, for example, that while stages and could be pipelined, we are not able to do so as we must perform all PC in a single thread. Adding parallelism would require major modi cations to Obliv-C that are outside the scope of this project.
Our implementation consists of three logical groups of stages that run in separate threads:
stage , stages -, and stages -. While performing all PC in a single stage is not ideal, in fact the group consisting of stages -is the bottleneck, so splitting stages -would not result in a signi cant speedup.
. . Batching
In scenarios such as Certi cate Transparency, client latency is a small concern compared to the impact of raw throughput on scalability. We explore how to widen bottlenecks in the pipeline discussed above by batching and processing multiple independent requests in parallel. While this approach results in longer per-request processing times, we can increase the ability of server pairs to handle higher load.
We rst enable the system to successfully process interleaved requests -two or more simultaneously transmitted query shares may arrive at a server in any order and still be processed correctly. We synchronize and update the pending, incomplete queries by their commitment values and expose a queue-based interface to the main le access handler, similar to the queues used to implement pipelining. The handler withdraws requests from the queue, synchronizes with the second server, and processes the query as normal. This capability allows for processing sets of batched requests, simply by withdrawing more than query at a time from the incoming queue.
Interacting with the ORAM requires a set of individual path queries, so it is di cult to fully merge a batch of queries. However, we observe that the Circuit ORAM's tree-based structure results in notable overlap between di erent operations. In addition, while computing over the small le-index ORAM is quite quick in a -party computation setting, operations on the larger lesystem tree is more costly. Rather than synchronizing the data ORAM serially for every request, we compose the changes caused by the batch as a whole to require at most one update per block in the tree.
As a simple example, imagine a query that results in a block eviction into the root, followed by a second query whose result moves the same block from the tree root to a bucket at a leaf. Operating sequentially, we would follow these exact steps and relocate the same data block twice. On the other hand, applying multiple operations to the index ORAM tree at once, while performing the appropriate ushes, can yield more e cient updates, in this case directly from the stash into a leaf bucket.
Implementing this requires a fundamental change to the type of permutation generated by the PC before it is applied by each server to the data ORAM. Whereas previous permutations consist solely of two paths intersecting only at the stash and root, composing the result of many individual evictions requires combining a subtree of varying shape, depending on the particular slice of the eviction schedule. Maintaining a full-tree permutation representation is not memory e cient or necessary; instead, we continue to track changes to the ORAM tree in a global context (rather than relative to the current eviction path), but in a lightweight C macro-based map [ ] that scales the batch size.
We found that removing path-relative tracking reduces the complexity of index management required to track ORAM changes, as we can reset the index values at any point and derive any changes made to the entire tree after some amount of processing. This structure can be collapsed into an array with explicit index labels in order to create permutation shares for the individual machines and apply the tracked changes to the lesystem itself.
Evaluation
Our primary evaluation mechanism was observing the behavior of the modi ed oblivious le sharing system under load from multiple concurrent clients, requesting as many randomly-selected les as possible over a second window, extracting latency and throughput behavior as the number of competing clients (e.g. potential CT-enabled browsers) increases.
For our testing we used an Ubuntu m d.xlarge NVMe SSD type AWS instance running on one core with GB memory. Without any improvements at all, a single serial request may take . s or more on our experimental setup depending on the request size and database size.
While we did observe positive trends associated with our systems-level optimizations, they did not signi cantly change the overall complexity of processing each request. Due to general resource constraints and the aforementioned request complexity, we had to limit our evaluation to small numbers of parallel clients instead of the larger scale that would be more realistically seen in a potential real-world datacenter.
. Precomputation
As discussed previously, encryption caching by itself provides a little bit of speedup but does not change the overall complexity. Similarly, precomputing the garbled circuits technically does not change the big-O complexity, but in practice shaves o more time than caching of exponentiation results. Together, they make the latency more bearable.
. Pipelining Figure . evaluates the impact of encryption and garbled circuit precomputation/caching and the pipelining mentioned in Section on client latency. The lled in measurements represent clients running a two-stage pipeline, and indicate that such a technique can slightly increase the e ectiveness of other optimization. Speci cally, as the number of concurrent clients increases, simply pre-computing exponentiations does not bene t client latency, but pipelining lowers average latency by a constant factor and bene ts exponentiation. This is likely due to the fact Figure . : Average client latency under contention, with pipelining enabled and disabled.
that the caching in the baseline serial implementation only occurs when there are no requests to be handled, whereas the inclusion of multiple pipeline stage threads allows exponentiation to persist in the background. Thus, we believe the ability to concurrently schedule di erent tasks can directly impact overall system e ectiveness. Figure . tracks server-side throughput with multiple outstanding requests (in these experiments, the clients only send one query at a time). As expected, pipelining performs at the same level as the baseline when only one request is processed at a time since each of the other stages are empty. Throughput rises drastically with two parallel requests ( lling up both current pipeline stages) and attens out with increased load as the pipeline is completely full. As mentioned earlier, a more exible MPC implementation with multithreading capabilities would enable much ner granularity (more pipeline stages) and therefore more signi cant performance gains. The bestperforming combination in terms of throughput was again both precomputation and pipelining with an approximate % performance gain, although a pure pipelining-based approach was eventually able to exceed the initial raw performance boost o ered by pre-computation. Again, as with latency, which these improvements do make the system faster, they do not perform signi cantly better as more and more requests are provided.
. Batching
We successfully modi ed the oblivious Circuit ORAM implementation used by our le sharing system to track and collapse subtree-based modi cations for arbitrary batch sizes as described in Section . However, we encountered an late implementation issue using Obliv-C to expose the per-server permutations to each party in the PC. Thus, while we can demonstrate that such a method will work in practice, we were not able to perform the same evaluation as above while batching was enabled. Figure . : Server throughput as the number of parallel requests grows, with pipelining enabled and disabled.
Conclusion and Open estions
We have shown that while conducting private queries on public databases is possible without the use of hardware enclaves, the opportunity for systems-based approaches to make scalability gains is signi cant. Neither our upgraded oblivious le sharing system nor similar privacy-preserving systems are ready to serve hundreds of millions of users, but they provide an important rst step.
This demonstrates that improvement of performance while preserving privacy is possible, and more work will make our goal a reality.
Currently, it is possible that speci c individuals with the right personal incentives, such as human rights workers or asylum seekers, would be willing to deal with the extra latency for the sake of privacy and security.
To serve users at scale, our system needs to be able to scale to multiple machines. but designing a similar construction that works with PC and in the larger oblivious le sharing system presents a signi cant challenge.
One possible area for even future improvement is making the requests for the Merkle tree proof more e cient. Currently, we individually request each node in the Merkle tree proof. However, being able to do the requests and evictions in one pass would reduce the overall request time. We must be careful, however, to ensure that none of the requests reveal anything about the others, and thus hide from the server the path of the Merkle tree proof and the ultimate value of the originally requested certi cate at the leaf.
As a side note, it would be helpful to see how our implementation holds up against a real-world CT server. The publicly available source code on Github by Google has two versions, a deprecated C version and a newer Golang version. Because the existing oblivious le sharing system and most of our codebase has already been implemented in C, we have been working with the deprecated C version of CT as well for simplicity's sake.
While the protocols often used in such projects are highly studied and constructed for e ciency, real-world cryptosystems are only broadly adopted if they are practical to deploy and operate at reasonable cost. We hope to continue our work on both privacy-sensitive, secure internet infrastructure, including Certi cate Transparency, and scalable private systems in general. 
